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STATEMENT QF JURISP1CTQN 
Jurisdiction over this \V\ J and ttie cross appeal of Ums to which Otis reply herein, is 
I . , 78 ?«• V?Kj>. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
i: ^'byHa« fMyung 
Ja Oh ( Uiu , io \\d>iic ioiui&hi Satsuda and Su>n Sil Satsuda flk im^ and 
Satsudas entered into an Earnest Money Sales Agreeme \ 
and execiitecl the final closing documents in the transavUv». *,» w _ * u January 5, 1990. 
On Mai ch 15, 1990, the Satsudas initiated this civil action against the Ohs. In a complaint 
z JII^ ^ latory code violations that plagued the Capitol Motel. The Satsudas maintained 
that, as a result oil ihese legal deficiencies liiin \ \w\ idim I fir linn llii ot their barpain mi 
purchasing the Capitol Motel; were forced to initiate costly administrative proceedings to obtain 
a zoning variance; and were obliged to make cMensivc repair .<> Io the I Motel. 
In their first cause of action, the Satsudas claimed that the Ohs breached warranties In the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement in three respects: 
I I IIIII I .tpilol M «li I tund sufficient parking spaces under Salt Lake City zoning regulations 
to allow loi flit rental ot only 33 oi its 40 rooms at nnv time to the public; 
vn.iill ol illiu I i in i i il i in I lillluiili 1  , iiN mi III ill marietiualr i. cnttlation as well as substantial u 
plumbing and electrical fixtures; and 
^ Seven . • rooms were umsUutli 11 lulliniil I ill I  .ill! I id Imililin/ itriinit. 
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In their second and third claims, the Satsudas alleged that the Ohs intentionally 
misrepresented the physical condition of the Capitol Motel and the Motel's compliance with 
applicable zoning and regulatory requirements. The second cause of action took as its 
misrepresentations the three deficiencies set out in the First Cause of Action, while the Third 
Cause of Action maintained that, although the Ohs represented that the Capitol Motel was a 
40-unit motel, it was actually only a 33-room facility due to various health, safety, and building 
code violations that afflicted 7 of its rooms. 
On April 8, 1993, the Ohs filed a third-party action against the Urns, from whom they had 
purchased the Capitol Motel in May 1987. In their Third-Party Complaint, the Ohs alleged that 
the Urns knew of the Capitol Motel's structural and legal faults, yet failed to disclose them prior 
to the 1987 sale. In other words, for third-party pleading purposes, Ohs alleged, essentially, that 
the defects in the property claimed by Satsudas in the Complaint existed in the property while 
under Urns' ownership and prior to the sale to Ohs. The Ohs sought monetary damages from 
the Urns and indemnification for any damages for which they might be found liable to Satsudas. 
On February 14 and 15, 1995, trial was conducted to the Court, the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick presiding. At trial, die Satsudas pressed only three claims against Ohs. They argued 
that they were due monetary compensation for: (1) profits lost due to their inability to rent the 
seven motel rooms that were constructed by the Urns without a building permit; (2) costs 
incurred to bring the seven rooms into compliance with Salt Lake City health and safety 
regulations; and (3) attorney's fees incurred to obtain a zoning variance authorizing the operation 
of a 40-room motel with only 33 parking stalls. 
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The District Court took the matter under advisement at the close of the evidence and, on 
February 17, 1995, rendered its decision from the bench. In its ruling, the Court declared that 
the Satsudas had failed to state any cause of action against the Ohs and, accordingly, dismissed 
their Complaint with prejudice. In light of the Satsudas' failure of proof, the Court also 
determined that the Urns could not be held liable to the Ohs on a theory of indemnity and 
therefore dismissed the Third-Party Complaint with prejudice. 
On May 2, 1995, Judge Frederick's "Order of Dismissal of Complaint and Third-Party 
Complaint and Judgment in Favor of Defendant Ohs against Plaintiff Satsudas for Attorney's 
Fees" (the "May 2 Order and Judgment") was entered on the judgment docket of the District 
Court. In the May 2 Order and Judgment, the Court memorialized the elements of its 
February 17 oral ruling. Specifically, the court concluded: 
1. The Complaint of plaintiffs against defendants Hasin Oh and Myung Ja Oh be and 
herewith is dismissed, with prejudice, on the merits, the Court finding no cause of action 
thereon. 
2. The Third-Party Complaint against third-party defendants Kee Hong Urn and Shi Ja 
Um be and herewith is dismissed with prejudice, on the merits, the Court finding no 
cause of action thereon as a result of the Court finding no qmse of action on the 
Complaint. 
3. Defendants Hasin Oh and Myung Ja Oh are awarded their attorney's fees as requested 
against plaintiffs Wayne Takashi Satsuda and Seon Sil Satsuda, [in the amount of 
$44,959.86 plus post-judgment interest], the court finding that the fees requested are 
reasonable and necessary and that an adequate basis in the contract exist for such an 
award. 
4. The Court denies the third-party defendants' application for attorney's fees at this 
time, without prejudice subject to further proceedings concerning that application. 
193236.1 4 
May 2 Order and Judgment at 2-3, Record on Appeal ("ROA"), V.4 at 1655-58 (emphasis 
added). On June 5, 1995, the Satsudas filed a Notice of Appeal from the District Court's May 
2 Order and Judgment. 
On June 9, 1995, Judge Frederick's "First Amended Order of Dismissal of Complaint and 
Third-Party Complaint and Judgment in Favor of Defendants Ohs Against Plaintiff Satsudas for 
Attorney's Fees (the "First Amended Oder") was entered. The First Amended Order differed 
from the May 2 Order and Judgment in only one significant respect. Where the May 2 Order 
and Judgment stated that "[tjhe Court denies the Third-Party Defendants' application for 
attorney's fees at this time, without prejudice subject to further proceedings concerning that 
application/ the First Amended Order read "[t]he Court awards the Third-Party Defendants' 
reasonable attorney's fees at this time subject to further proceedings concerning the amount to 
be awarded which shall be the subject of a further order and judgment." On July 10, 1995, the 
Satsudas filed an "Amended Notice of Appeal" from the First Amended Order. 
As directed by the First Amended Order, the Urns submitted Supplemental Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law pertaining to their claim for attorney's fees and drafted a proposed 
Supplemental Judgment that awarded them fees of $56,126.77 plus post-judgment interest. On 
July 7, 1995, the District Court executed the Supplemental Judgment and its associated findings 
and conclusions. On July 27, 1995, the Satsudas filed a "Second Amended Notice of Appeal" 
from the July 7 Supplemental Judgment and on August 2, 1995, the Urns submitted their Notice 
of Cross-Appeal from the Supplemental Judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Capitol Motel was in a dilapidated condition when it was bought by Kee Hong Urn 
and Shi Ja Urn (the "Urns") on September 1, 1982. Immediately thereafter, Salt Lake City 
officials closed the Capitol Motel entirely. ROA, V.3 at 1185. 
2. One room on the second floor of the Capitol Motel's main building had been converted 
from a storage area to a rental unit by Juan Garcia, the owner of the Capitol Motel prior to the 
Urns. M. at 1186. 
3. In the Spring of 1983, the Urns completed repairs to the Capitol Motel that restored all 
34 of the Motel's licensed rental units to operation. M- at 1185. 
4. Also in the Spring of 1983, the Urns covered over the swimming pool on the Capitol 
Motel grounds to allow construction of a small grocery store on the Capitol Motel premises. Id. 
at 1186. 
5. In January 1984, the Urns converted the grocery store into rental units, giving the Capitol 
Motel a total of 40 units available for rent when Ohs purchased the property in 1987. Id. 
6. The Urns knew that no building permit had been obtained for the conversion of the 
grocery store into the five rental units. The Urns did not instruct their construction contractor 
to obtain such a permit and none was obtained. Id-
7. The Urns never notified Salt Lake City officials that the five additional units were 
constructed on the Capitol Motel premises. M-
8. The Urns did not amend their business license for the Capitol Motel after adding five new 
units; instead, the Urns annually renewed their business license to show only a 34-unit motel. 
Id., at 1187. 
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9. During the Urns' ownership of the Capitol Motel, the Salt Lake City-County Health 
Department and the Salt Lake City Fire Department inspected the Motel's buildings and grounds. 
Both agencies found that the Motel met applicable inspection standards after repairs were 
completed in 1982-83. Id. at 1186. 
10. On March 21, 1985, the Capitol Motel was inspected by Salt Lake City officials under 
Construction Permit No. 33603 and approved for occupancy. Id. at 1186. 
11. After passing inspection on March 21, 1985, the Ums never received any written notice 
that the additional five units did not meet Salt Lake City building code standards. Id. at 1187. 
12. Thereafter, the Ums operated the Capitol Motel with a total of 40 rooms available for 
rent to the public. Id. 
13. From March 21, 1985, until January 1990, the Capitol Motel passed every health, 
building, and fire inspection following the construction of the five additional rooms. Id. 
14. On February 28, 1987, the Ums executed an Earnest Money Sales Agreement with the 
Ohs for the sale of "a 40-unit motel called Capitol Motel" for $550,000. Id. 
15. Between the execution of the February 1987 Earnest Money Sales Agreement and the 
closing of the Capitol Motel, the Ums told the Ohs that they could earn a good income from the 
operation of the Motel and gave the Satsudas copies of the Motel's handwritten Income and 
Expense Statement. The Ums also told the Ohs that they had remodeled or repaired most of the 
rooms in the Capitol Motel and had made repairs to the main building of the Motel. Id. at 
1187-88. 
16. In conjunction with the 1987 sale of the Capitol Motel, the Ums also told the Ohs that 
the Motel had up to 40 units available for rental. Id- at 1188. 
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17. The Ohs visited the Capitol Motel about ten times prior to executing the February 1987 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement. During those visits, the Ohs inspected only a few rooms on 
the ground floor of the Motel's main building. Id. at 1188. 
18. The Ohs did not obtain a professional inspection of the Capitol Motel before purchasing 
it from the Ums. Id. 
19. At no time before or after the 1987 sale of the Capitol Motel did the Ohs expressly ask 
the Ums to provide information about parking, building inspections, construction of additional 
rooms, putting additional rooms into service, or inspection of the Motel property by the Ums or 
Salt Lake City officials. Id-
20. On March 20, 1987, the Salt Lake City/County Health Department inspected the Capitol 
Motel and found only minor infractions of health regulations such as dust under a bed, a dirty 
bathroom, and no lid on the Motel dumpsters. Id. 
21. On May 1, 1987 > the Ums, as sellers, and the Ohs, as buyers, executed a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract for the purchase of the Capitol Motel. The purchase price of the Motel was 
$540,000. Id. at 1189. 
22. During their ownership of the Capitol Motel, the Ohs advertised to the public that the 
Motel had 40 rental units. In addition, the Ohs consistently rented more than 34 units at a time 
to the public. Id. 
23. The Salt Lake City Fire Department conducted fire safety surveys on the Capitol Motel 
in 1982, 1984, 1986, in November 1989, January 1990, February 1990, and June 1993. Id. at 
1189. 
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24. The Salt Lake City Fire Department's "Premises History Report" for the Capitol Motel 
shows that minor fire code violations were noted in the Fire Department's 1986 inspection. 
These discrepancies were promptly corrected. Id. 
25. The Premises History Report also shows that the Capitol Motel passed fire safety surveys 
on November 7, 1989, and January 4, 1990, just before the Ohs sold the property to the 
Satsudas. Id. 
26. On November 16, 1989, the Ohs executed an Earnest Money Sales Agreement with the 
Satsudas for the sale of the Capitol Motel for $620,000. Id- at 1189-90. 
27. During the negotiations for the sale of the Capitol Motel to the Satsudas, the Ohs 
represented orally and on Mr. Oh's business card that the Capitol Motel was a 40-unit motel. 
Id. at 1190. 
28. Also during negotiations for the sale of the Capitol Motel to the Satsudas, Mr. Oh gave 
the Satsudas his business records which showed the Capitol Motel's daily income figures for 
1987 through September 1989. The Ohs' business records showed the number of the Capitol 
Motel's units that were rented at any one time. Id. 
29. The Satsudas submitted an Offer to Purchase the Capitol Motel to a Mr. Kim, the Ohs' 
sales agent, after two meetings with the Ohs at the Capitol Motel. Id. 
30. The Satsudas inspected the Capitol Motel's laundry room, boiler rooms, and four or five 
rental units prior to closing their purchase of the Capitol Motel. Id. at 1190. 
31. Prior to closing on their purchase of the Capitol Motel, the Satsudas neither requested 
nor obtained an inspection of the Motel's buildings and grounds by a professional inspector or 
any other third party. Id. 
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32. The Satsudas began operating the Capitol Motel on January 1, 1990. M. 
33. The Ohs displayed the Capitol Motel's business license on the wall of the Motel office. 
The Satsudas examined the business license there on January 1, 1990, four days before they 
closed on their purchase of the Motel. M- at 1191. 
34. On January 5, 1990, the Ohs assigned their purchaser's interest in the May 1, 1987, 
Uniform Real Estate Contract to the Satsudas. Id-
35. On or about January 31, 1990, Lawrence Suggars, an enforcement officer with the Salt 
Lake City Department of Building and Housing Services, inspected the Capitol Motel premises. 
Mr. Suggars was accompanied on his inspection by representatives of the Salt Lake City Fire 
Department and the Salt Lake City Health Department. Id. 
36. During the course of his inspection of the Capitol Motel, Mr. Suggars called in 
additional Salt Lake City building inspectors to examine the Capitol Motel's electrical and 
plumbing systems. Id. at 1191. 
37. On February 12, 1990, the Salt Lake City Department of Building and Housing Services 
issued a "Notice of Deficiencies" to the Satsudas stating that the Capitol Motel was in violation 
of certain City health and safety ordinances. Id. 
38. By letter dated February 22, 1990, Robert M. Bridge, the Salt Lake City Business 
License Supervisor, advised the Satsudas that the Capitol Motel's business license would not be 
approved due to the incorrect number of rental units listed on the license. Immediately 
thereafter, the Satsudas corrected the number of units shown on their license. Id- at 1191-92. 
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39. The Satsudas contacted the Urns about the Notice of Deficiencies. At that time, 
Mr. Um told Mrs. Satsuda that he had fully disclosed to the Ohs the fact that the five additional 
rental units at the Capitol Motel had been built without a building permit. Id- at 1192. 
40. When the Ohs sold the Capitol Motel to the Satsudas, parking at the Motel was limited 
to only 33 vehicles, less than one vehicle per rentable room at the Motel. Id. 
41. The Satsudas spent approximately $2,500 in attorney's fees to obtain a variance in the 
parking requirements in order to allow the rental of all 40 of the Capitol Motel's rooms. Id-
42. During his January 1990 inspection of the Capitol Motel, Lawrence Suggars determined 
that rooms 0, 7 and 35-39 were plumbed incorrectly and had substandard electrical wiring. Id-
43. These remaining five rooms at the Capitol Motel were remodeled after the parking 
variance was approved by Salt Lake City in November 1990. Construction on rooms 0, 7 and 
35-39 started in February 1991 and was completed in March 1991. Id. 
44. On January 5, 1994, the Satsudas sold the Capitol Motel for $860,000, a sum $240,000 
greater than the price they paid for the Motel in January 1990. Id. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Urn's cross-appeal brief fails to succinctly state the issues presented in the cross-appeal. 
Likewise, the cross-appeal brief fails to clearly parse the issues presented on the cross-appeal 
from those presented in the main appeal. Consequently, Ohs present the issues to be determined 
on this cross-appeal as follows: 
1. With respect to the Third-Party Complaint, were Urns a "prevailing party" and thus 
entitled to an award of attorney's fees as a matter of right against Ohs? 
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2. Did the District Court err in awarding Ums attorney's fees as a "pass through" directly 
against Satsudas while refusing to adjudge Ohs jointly and severally liable for those same 
attorney's fees? 
STANPARP OF KEVffiW 
Decisions concerning the award of costs and attorneys fees to litigants at the conclusion 
of a case are reviewed for abuse of discretion. £g£. e.g., Utah Code Annotated, § 78-27-56.5 
(1986); Jenkins yt Bailey, 676 P.2d 391,393 (Utah 1984); Twtte Management, foe, v, Haggis 
Management, foe, 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982); Peckstrom v. Becfrsfrom, 578 P.2d 520 
(Utah 1978); Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
Ums have failed to marshall the evidence supporting the District Court's refusal to award 
Urns' attorneys fees against Ohs jointly and severally with its award of Ums' attorneys fees 
against Satsudas. The evidence supporting this judgment includes: testimony that the defects 
in the Capitol Motel claimed by Satsudas in their suit against Ohs were created by Ums or 
otherwise existed during Ums' ownership of the property; and, testimony that Ums failed to 
disclose these defects and conditions to Ohs when Ohs purchased the Capitol Motel from Ums. 
Ohs' second argument is that Ums' presumption that they were the "prevailing parties" in the 
third-party action is misplaced. Ohs' claims against Ums in the third-party action were claims 
basically in indemnity and because the District Court dismissed Satsudas' claim against Ohs on 
the merits, the District Court never reached the question of whether Ums breached the contract 
with Ohs or, otherwise stated, whether Ums successfully defended a claim of breach of contract. 
Utah case law does not provide a bright-line rule for determining who is a "prevailing party" in 
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multiple party litigation, but demands, to the contrary, a flexible and reasoned approach to 
deciding in particular cases who actually is the prevailing party. Because the District Court 
dismissed the Third-Party Complaint solely because Ohs had prevailed against Satsudas in the 
main claim, Urns cannot be considered a "prevailing party" with respect to the Third-Party 
Complaint sufficient to form a basis for an award of Urns attorneys fees directly against Ohs. 
Ohs' third argument is that the District Court award of Urns' attorneys fees directly against 
Satsudas, without a joint and several judgment for those fees against Ohs, was a remedy crafted 
within the grant of discretion to trial courts over whether to award attorneys fees, against whom, 
and in what amount. Urns are incorrect in urging an error of law standard of review in this 
cross-appeal; when awards of attorneys fees are involved, the standard is abuse of discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
UMS HAVE FAILED TO ADEQUATELY MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S ATTORNEY FEE AWARD 
Urns, despite claiming that they challenge only the District Court's Conclusions of Law with 
respect to its refusal to award Urns' fees against Ohs, essentially challenge the District Court's 
Findings of Fact with respect to the provisions of the agreements between Ohs and Urns 
concerning award of attorneys fees in the event of litigation. 
Urns blithely conclude that they are necessarily "prevailing parties" as that term is used in 
the agreements between them and Ohs, and that the District Court must necessarily make factual 
findings that their prevailing party status, combined with the provisions of the agreements, 
translate into an automatic right to an award of fees against Ohs. By proceeding immediately 
to this conclusion in their Brief, Urns have failed to marshall the evidence supporting the factual 
underpinnings of the attorneys fee remedy entered by the District Court. 
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In order to challenge a trial court's findings of fact, a party Hmust marshall the 
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be "against the 
clear weight of the evidence11 thus making them "clearly erroneous.'" (Citation 
omitted.) 
Mountain States groadcasting Company v, Neate, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah App. 1989) 
(emphasis in original). "Appellants often overlook or disregard this heavy burden." M. 
Evidence supporting an award of Urns' attorneys fees that bypasses Ohs and is assessed only 
against Satsudas includes: that the construction of 6 additional units, bringing the motel to 40 
units, thus creating a conflict with the zoning regulations concerning available parking, occurred 
during Urns' ownership of the property and that Ums failed to obtain building permits for this 
construction during their ownership of the Motel (ROA, V.3 at 1185); and Mr. Ohs' trial 
testimony that the Ums failed to inform him of the failure to obtain a building permit for 
construction of additional rooms or that the business license failed to account for the number of 
rooms Mr. Um made available for rent. Transcript of Trial Proceedings, pp. 196-97, ROA at 
2138-39. 
"When the duty to marshall is not properly discharged, [the appellate court] [will] refuse to 
consider the merits of challenges to the findings and accept the findings as valid (citations 
omitted)". Mountain States Broadcasting Company, supra at 553. Because of Ums' failure to 
marshall evidence supporting the District Court's award of attorneys fees, their challenge to the 
findings must be rejected. 
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UMS ARE NOT "PREVAILING PARTIES" IN THE THIRD 
PARTY LITIGATION FOR PURPOSES OF CONSIDERING 
AN AWARD OF THEIR ATTORNEY'S FEES AGAINST OHS 
Citing to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 and the "prevailing party" attorneys fee award 
provisions in the written agreements between Ohs and Ums, Ums argue that they are the 
"prevailing parties" in the third-party litigation simply because the Third-Party Complaint was 
dismissed. Ums Cross-Appeal Brief at 10-11. Ums premise this argument on the mistaken 
belief that they "successfully raised the contract and its provisions in defense against the Ohs' 
and Satsudas' claims, resulting in a complete nonsuit. . .." Id. at 11. Ums also erroneously 
assume that the District Court implicitly concluded that "there is no default or breach of the 
terms of the contract [between Ohs and Ums]," Id. at 11, and that the dismissal of the Third-
Party Complaint was, ipso facto, a "net" judgment in favor of Ums. Id. at 10. 
Urns' legal and factual assumptions concerning their "prevailing party" status in the third-
party action is misplaced because: (1) the Third-Party Complaint was dismissed solely because 
Ohs prevailed on the main claim against Satsudas, rendering the third-party indemnity claim 
essentially moot, such that the District Court did not reach the issue of whether Ums actually 
breached their agreements with Ohs (or, indeed, whether Ums successfully defended, on the 
merits, a contract claim by Ohs); and (2) this Court has not adopted the rigid determinative 
standard of "prevailing party" status premised on the simple dismissal of claims urged by Ums, 
but, rather, recognizes "the need for a flexible and reasoned approach to deciding in particular 
cases who actually is the prevailing party." Mountain States Broadcasting, supra, at 557. 
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Under both the facts of this case and the applicable legal standard, Ums cannot be construed 
as a "prevailing party" in the third-party action sufficient to provide a basis for joint and several 
award of their attorneys fees against both Ohs and Satsudas. 
An accurate understanding of the District Court's basis for dismissing the Third-Party 
Complaint is essential to proper resolution of this issue. In the final Order entered by the 
District Court dismissing the Complaint and the Third-Party Complaint, the basis for dismissal 
of the Third-Party Complaint was clearly explained: 
2. The Third-Party Complaint against third-party defendants Kee Hong Um and 
Shi Ja Um be and herewith is dismissed with prejudice, on the merits, the Court 
finding no cause of action thereon as a result of the Court finding no cause of 
action on the Complaint. 
First Amended Order of Dismissal of Complaint and Third-Party Complaint and Judgment in 
Favor of Defendant Ohs against Plaintiffs Satsudas for Attorney Fees, ROA, V. 4, at 1716-17. 
Moreover, in its oral ruling from the bench, the District Court recognized, in the context of 
discussion concerning the appropriate amount of attorneys fees, that Ums "success" on the Third-
Party Complaint was entirely a function of the District Court's ruling on the Complaint: 
(BY JUDGE FREDERICK): I am somewhat concerned, given the identity - -
essential identity of role in this case between the defendants and the third-party 
defendants that there not be duplication in the claimed fees to be paid here. While 
it is true that a better posture of the case may well have been to name third-party 
defendants as defendants so that this issue was not as confused as it is, the fact is 
that is not the case, so I am confronted with the need to make a determination 
about fees to the defendants and then, in turn, fees to the third-party defendants 
Reporter's Transcript of Judge's Ruling of February 17, 1995, ROA at 2237. Moreover, the 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contain no findings or conclusions 
concerning breach of or compliance with the terms of the written contracts between Ohs and Ums 
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but, rather, address only the substantive findings and conclusions with respect to Ohs' successful 
defense against Satsudas claim. First Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ROA, 
V. 4, at 1704 -14. With respect to the dismissal of the Third-Party Complaint, the Conclusions 
of Law entered by the District Court simply and accurately state that "[t]he Court concludes that 
the third-party case was and is a necessary step taken by defendants to defend the Complaint and 
the dismissal of the Third-Party Complaint is a direct result of dismissal of the complaint." M-
at 1713 (emphasis added). 
This Court has expressly rejected the mechanical application of the "net judgment rule" for 
determining who is the prevailing party in any particular case. Mountain States Broadcasting 
Company v. Neale. supra, at 557. Instead, this Court has recognized that "the determination of 
a "prevailing party" becomes even more complicated in cases involving multiple claims and 
parties." M. at 556, n.7, citing, pioneer Roofing Company vt Mardian Construction Company, 
152 Ariz. 455, 733 P.2d 652 (Ct. App. 1986). This Court also appropriately recognized that 
where the ultimate award of money damages does not adequately represent the actual success of 
the parties under the peculiar posture of the case, there is a particular need for a flexible and 
reasoned approach to deciding in particular cases who is the prevailing party. Id., citing, Owen 
Jones and Sons, Inc. v. C.R. Lewis Company. 497 P.2d 312, 313-14 (Alaska 1972). 
Courts across the country have taken varying approaches to determining "prevailing party" 
status for purposes of attorney fee awards, all of which incorporate a flexible, reasoned approach 
to the facts of a particular case rather than a rigid approach to what can often be a complicated 
determination. Sfi£> e.g., Annotation, Who is the "Successjul Party" or "Prevailing Party" For 
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Purposes of Awarding Costs Where Both Parties Prevail on Affirmative Claims, 66 A.L.R. 3d 
115 (1975), cited in Mountain States Broadcasting Company v. Neale. supra, at 556. 
A determination of which party prevails and is entitled to costs is within the discretion of the 
trial judge. Owen tones and SOPS, Im, v, C.R, Lewis Company, supra, at 314; Pixie State 
Baric y, fractal, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988), citing, Jenkins v. Bailey, 676 P.2d 391, 393 
(Utah 1984) and Tmtle Management, Inc, v. Haggis Management, inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 
(Utah 1982). * Consequently, this Court need only decide whether, under the facts of this 
particular case, the District Court abused its discretion by refusing to award Urns' attorneys fees 
against Ohs by finding, at least implicitly, that Urns were not the prevailing party with respect 
to the third-party action. 
Factors in this case supporting the notion that Urns were not the "prevailing parties," and 
upon which the District Court could exercise its discretion, are legion: 
(1) the third-party claims were claims in indemnity and were dismissed by the District Court 
specifically, and only, on the basis that Ohs succeeded on the main claim against Satsudas; (2) 
the District Court never reached the issue, because it did not need to reach the issue, of whether 
Urns breached their contracts with Ohs (or, conversely, whether Urns successfully defended their 
performance under the contracts); 
1
 Contrary to Urns reading of it, Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-56.5 affords the 
trial court discretion over issues of awarding attorneys fees by providing that "[a] court may 
award costs and attorneys fees to either party that prevails in a civil action based upon any 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing . . . " (emphasis added). 
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(3) the District Court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law concerning Urns' 
breach of or compliance with the terms of the written agreements between them and Ohs, and 
Urns never requested any at the District Court; 
(4) Ohs prevailed against Satsudas on the merits, thereby protecting Urns from liability on 
the third-party claim, such that it would be patently inequitable to characterize Ohs as parties 
who did not prevail in the action; and 
(5) the defenses of the main claim and the third-party case were inextricably intertwined, 
both factually and legally, and Ohs efforts essentially provided Urns defense of the third-party 
claims. 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF UMS* ATTORNEYS FEES DIRECTLY 
AGAINST SATSUDAS, BYPASSING OHS, WAS A REMEDY CRAFTED 
WITHIN THE DISCRETION AFFORDED TO THE TRIAL COURTS 
CONCERNING AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS FEES IN LITIGATION 
Ums attack the District Court's award of their attorneys fees solely against Satsudas, without 
a joint and several judgment against Ohs, as inconsistent with the District Court's findings, 
contrary to the contractual provisions concerning attorneys fees in the agreements between Ohs 
and Ums, and contrary to Utah decisional law that Ums interpret as making fee awards 
mandatory in cases involving contractual disputes such as these. Um Cross-Appeal Brief at 9-10. 
As argued above, Ums were not "prevailing parties" in the first instance, and therefore failed 
to cross the threshold requirement for an award of attorneys fees. Nevertheless, and assuming 
for sake of argument that Ums were "prevailing parties" in some sense or otherwise entitled to 
an award of attorneys fees against someone, Ums argument for reversal for the format of the 
attorneys fee award made by the District Court is still unavailing. 
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In view of the broad discretion afforded to trial courts in awarding attorneys fees in 
litigation,2 Urns must shoulder the difficult burden of demonstrating that the District Court 
somehow abused its discretion in awarding their attorneys fees against Satsudas on a "pass 
through" basis. This Urns cannot do. 
Utah appellate courts have routinely affirmed the discretion of trial courts that refused to 
award attorneys fees to parties that prevailed on a number of issues involving a contract where 
the contract provides for fee awards. See, e.g., Maynard v. Wharton. 912 P.2d 446, 451-52 
(Utah 1996)(refusing to award attorneys fees under the terms of an earnest money agreement);3 
Schafir v. Harrigan. 879 P.2d 1384, 1393-94 (Utah App. 1994)(order denying vendors' motion 
for attorneys fees pursuant to an earnest money sales agreement after they prevailed in an action 
brought by purchasers was not an abuse of discretion; only one of the purchasers' claims 
stemmed from the contract, and the trial court determined that any fees or costs uniquely 
applicable to the contractual warranty claim were insignificant). 
The District Court acted well within its discretion to award Urns' fees as it did. In light of 
Urns' posture in the case, the District Court's reasons for dismissing the Third-Party Complaint, 
and the weakness in Urns' "prevailing party" argument, Urns are indeed fortunate that their fees 
2
 See, Utah Code Annotated, § 78-27-56.5 (1986)("A court may award costs and 
attorney's fees to either party that prevails . . ."); Jenkins v. Bailey, 676 P.2d 391, 393 
(Utah 1984); Twtte Management, fac. v. Haggis Management, tog., 645 P.2d 667, 671 
(Utah 1982); flecksfrpm v, Pecfotrom, 578 P.2d 520 (Utah 1978); Pmc State Bank vP 
Prackgq, 764 p.2d 985 (Utah 1988); Gifoert v, City of Caldwell, 732 P.2d 355, appealed 
after remand. 772 P.2d 242 (Idaho 1987); Qwen Jones and Sons, fac. V, C.R. Uwis Co,, 
497 P.2d 312 (Alaska 1972). 
3
 Urns acknowledge the holding in Maynard v. Wharton, arguing only that it "was 
decided wrongly." Um Cross-Appeal Brief at 12. 
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were awarded at all and against anyone; with this cross-appeal, Urns look the proverbial gift 
horse in the mouth. The District Court expressly found that the defects of which Satsudas 
complained against Ohs were present in the Motel property when Urns sold the property to Ohs 
originally. The District Court also found that "the third-party case was and is a necessary step 
taken by defendants to defend the Complaint..." ROA, V. 4, at 1713/ 
While the District Court's method of awarding attorneys fees is well within the broad 
discretion granted to trial courts generally with respect to fee award matters, the District Court's 
judgment also finds support in the "third-party fee" rule first enunciated by this Court in Collier 
v. Heinz. 827 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 1982). That rule holds that even where a contract does not 
provide for attorneys fees in the event of litigation between parties, the court can nevertheless 
award attorneys fees as a cost of litigation where litigation with a third party was a foreseeable 
consequence of the litigation initiated by the plaintiff. I$L £fi£ 2l3Q, Soifth Sanpitch Company 
v, Pack 765 P.2d 1279 (Utah App. 1988); Broadwater v. Old Republic Swety, 854 p.2d 523 
(Utah 1993). 
In any event, should this Court determine that Ohs' briefs present persuasive argument in 
favor of the award of attorneys fees made by the District Court, it may sustain the District 
Court's decision based on those arguments even if the District Court did not consider them. 
State v. Elder. 815 P.2d 1341, 1344, n. 4 (Utah App. 1991). 
4
 One could rationally conclude from the totality of the lower court record that the 
District Court found that Ohs added Urns as third-party defendants on a sound foundation in 
law and fact given the types of allegations made against Ohs by Satsudas, but that the District 
Court found that the pleading that essentially brought both Ohs and Urns into the case, 
Satsudas' Complaint, was not particularly meritorious. It is, therefore, not difficult to 
understand why the District Court would deem it appropriate to assess both Urns' fees and 
Ohs' fees against the protagonists of this drama, the Satsudas. 
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OHS ADEQUATELY PRESERVED ISSUES CONCERNING AWARD OF UMS 
ATTORNEYS FEES AT THE TRIAL COURT 
In a curious reversal of the normal burdens imposed on appellants in an appeal, Urns argue 
that "Ohs neither raised nor filed any objection to the supplemental findings [concerning Urns 
entitlement to attorneys fees]. . . and Ohs have filed no appeal of any part of the judgment or 
findings . . .[WJhile the Ohs certainly objected to the award of any judgment directly against 
them, upon which they prevailed, they have not contested the facts and law underlying that 
decision, and, upon the authority cited, they may not do so now.* Um Cross-Appeal Brief at 
9 -10. The thesis of this segment of Urns' Cross-Appeal Brief escapes detection, but at the risk 
of injecting unwarranted precision into Urns' contentions concerning preservation of issues for 
appeal, Ohs understanding of this point, to which they so respond, is that Ohs did not adequately 
object at the District Court to an award of Urns' attorneys fees against them, even though the 
District Court declined to do so. 
Urns evidently neglect to remember that Ohs are the appellees in this cross-appeal. It is 
Urns, not Ohs, who appeal from the District Court's order awarding their attorneys fees solely 
against Satsudas. As the party appealing from the District Court's ruling, it is Urns, not Ohs, 
who have the obligation to preserve the issue at the District Court to raise it on appeal. Gill v. 
Jimm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986); Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5)(A). 
Consequently, any suggestion that Ohs, as appellees to this cross-appeal, failed to preserve issues 
at the District Court for appeal, is simply ludicrous.5 
5
 In the event this Court determines that the District Court should consider awarding 
Urns' fees against Ohs, Ohs must be given the right to contest the issue of Urns' entitlement 
(continued...) 
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CONCLUSION 
In the preceding brief, the Ohs have shown that each issue raised by Urns either ignores the 
evidence put before the District Court or has no basis in law. For these reasons, the Ohs 
respectfully ask this Court to affirm the final judgment of the District Court in all respects. 
DATED this Q 1 Iby of November, 1996. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
AttorneV^Por Defendants, Appellees, Third-Party 
Pla$affs and Cross-Appeal Appellees 
5
 (...continued) 
to attorneys fees at the District Court level as well as the amount of those fees. Because the 
District Court reserved issues concerning attorneys fees to the post-trial segment of the case, 
ROA at 2237-8, and then proceeded to find that Urns were not entitled to attorneys fees 
against Ohs, but only against Satsudas, Ohs lacked standing at the District Court to object to 
Urns' entitlement to fees or the amount of fees. An award of attorneys fees may only be 
entered after the trial court has analyzed the reasonableness of the fees claimed, the 
appropriateness of the work actually performed and the claiming parties' entitlement to fees. 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). 
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